




**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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National Intelligence Daily

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*Tuesday
4 October 1983*

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
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LEBANON: Reconciliation Talks Still Stalled

Sporadic violence is likely to continue as long as attempts to initiate a national reconciliation conference founder on procedural issues. 

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Cease-fire violations increased yesterday, and US Marine positions at the Beirut airport came under artillery fire for the first time since the truce began on 26 September. The shelling of the airport occurred while Druze and Lebanese Army forces clashed nearby at Ash Shuwayfat. In Beirut's southern suburbs, Shia militia fighters and Army units again battled for control of roadblocks. 

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Despite the security committee's decision last week to remove checkpoints from the coastal highway leading south from Beirut, the Christian Lebanese Forces militia continues to control the highway between Ad Damur and Sidon. 

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Press reports state that nearly 600 Lebanese Army officers and enlisted men, most of whom are Druze, have deserted their units and gathered at an Army barracks in Hammana. They are protesting alleged cooperation between the Army and the Lebanese Forces Christian militia during the recent fighting in the Shuf. The Army acknowledged yesterday that at least 300 soldiers were at the barracks, officially on leave or unable to return to their units. 

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Shia leader Nabih Barri told US Embassy officials yesterday that he is pessimistic about the prospects for a political dialogue. He believes that both Syria and the Lebanese Government want to delay the reconciliation process. Barri also claimed that Saudi Arabia is willing to host the conference, but only if Syria drops its objections to the Saudi venue. 

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Comment: Officers and men of other religious groups may follow the example of the Druze deserters. If they do, the Army's ability to maintain the government's authority in the Beirut area will be seriously weakened. 

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The security committee cannot carry out its decisions unless neutral observers are brought in to supervise the truce. The cease-fire will continue to unravel unless discussions begin soon on national reconciliation. 

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
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
PAKISTAN: Continuing Unrest in Sind Province

Local elections in part of Sind Province on Sunday were marred by new violence amid signs of continuing grumbling by some senior Army officers over President Zia's handling of the situation.



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The US Consulate General in Karachi reports that the opposition's appeal for a general strike and a boycott of the elections in six rural districts was widely observed, with fewer than 10 percent of eligible voters going to the polls. Voting was obstructed in many towns and cities. Twenty people reportedly were killed when security forces tried to remove a roadblock.




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
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Meanwhile, the leader of an important opposition religious party postponed a planned antigovernment campaign over the weekend after Zia agreed to talks with him. The party leader did not announce a date when such talks would begin.




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Comment: The six districts where the elections took place on Sunday have been the most disaffected areas of Sind, and the low turnout and scattered violence were expected. The Army's support is crucial for Zia, and he is likely to make a show of negotiating with moderate opposition leaders.




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As long as the unrest in Sind persists, however, it will be difficult for major opposition groups to make a deal with Zia. They would fear that it would cost them their credibility.



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


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USSR-WESTERN EUROPE: Anti-INF Strategy

Moscow apparently hopes that a massive anti-INF campaign this fall among the populations of West European countries will persuade some governments to reverse their commitments to go ahead with deployments. 

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Izvestiya last week attacked West European politicians for following Washington's "militarist" course on INF and warned that their "chickens were coming home to roost"—an allusion to the mass demonstrations being planned for later this month. The large anti-INF march in Moscow this weekend provided an example for similar protests later this month in Western Europe. 


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Another Soviet newspaper last Friday published a "response" to purported questions from readers who were unable to reconcile reports of a swelling peace movement in Europe with the recent election of governments there that back INF deployment. The readers were reassured that these electorates do not approve of war and had not given their governments a mandate to deploy INF. 


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These articles follow General Secretary Andropov's statement last week that implied that West European leaders are disregarding their electorates' interests by supporting INF plans. 

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Comment: These developments suggest Moscow expects that NATO leaders will stand firm on the INF issue and the USSR will intensify its efforts to manipulate anti-INF sentiments in Western Europe. The Soviets probably still hope that large demonstrations will persuade some NATO governments to modify their positions. 

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The Soviets are likely to avoid taking a prominent, direct role in fanning agitation in West European countries and will rely on local supporters to foment unrest and organize demonstrations. They will attribute disruptions to discontent with INF policy. 

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
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COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA: Reaction to Sandinista Attack

President Monge's government is preparing a strong diplomatic response to a Nicaraguan attack on Costa Rican security forces, and the incident may lead to regional mediation efforts to prevent further violence. 

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Sandinista troops fired on Costa Rican security forces at the border post at Penas Blancas last week, following an earlier attack by anti-Sandinista insurgents. According to US Embassy sources, Sandinista artillery bombarded the Costa Ricans after the fighting with the insurgents had ceased. 

San Jose has recalled its Ambassador to Nicaragua and has reinforced its border security units. In addition, it has called for an extraordinary meeting of the OAS Permanent Council to denounce the incident, and it has asked Panama and Venezuela for political support. Meanwhile, Managua has requested that the Contadora countries—Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela—send observers to the border area to verify the aggression of the anti-Sandinistas. 


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Comment: The government's tough response, which is prompted in part by strong public reaction to the attack, probably is designed to show that it will not be intimidated by Sandinista military forces. By consulting with Panama and Venezuela, its strongest regional allies, San Jose may be preparing to request special security assistance. It may ask those two countries, along with Mexico and Colombia, to send a peacekeeping force to the border. 

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CYPRUS-UN: Turks Reject Secretary General's Plan

The negative Turkish and Turkish Cypriot responses to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's recent initiative on Cyprus are likely to scuttle further UN efforts to bring the two Cypriot communities to the negotiating table any time soon. [Redacted]

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A UN representative in Nicosia has told the US Embassy that both the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks have rejected the "form and substance" of the Secretary General's proposals. Last week the Greek Cypriots officially accepted the initiative. The new plan was designed to focus discussion on the most controversial aspects of a settlement—distribution of territory and the type of legislature and federal executive. [Redacted]

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Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash told the Secretary General last Saturday that he was willing to resume talks between the two communities, but only under the terms of a UN plan of 1981 that focused on less controversial issues. Denktash has threatened on several occasions to move ahead with plans to declare independence, particularly if talks are not resumed under the terms of the old plan. The Turkish Cypriot "Assembly" convenes this month and reportedly will consider legislation that would permit a referendum on independence. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Turkish rejection was unexpected because Ankara had seemed favorably disposed toward the plan. The Turks and Turkish Cypriots, however, probably fear that the new proposals will replace the earlier UN plan. They had strongly supported that plan, which had formed the basis of the intercommunal talks for the past two years. [Redacted]

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In addition, the Turks and Turkish Cypriots may be trying to protest Greek Cypriot efforts to publicize Cyprus in international forums. Early last week, for example, Cypriot Foreign Minister Iakovou referred to Turkey as an "occupying power" in his speech before the Council of Europe. [Redacted]

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Ankara's negative reaction will be a serious setback to the Secretary General's role in working toward a solution. If the Turkish Cypriots proceed with their plans to declare independence, tensions on the island almost certainly will increase. [Redacted]

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
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EL SALVADOR: Status of Peace Talks

All three members of the government's Peace Commission met last week in Bogota with four representatives of the guerrillas' political and military alliance. This was the second such meeting in a month. Commission leader Quinonez suggested that, if the Assembly concurred, the insurgents might consider working with the electoral council to plan the presidential elections in 1984. Guerrilla representatives, however, again demanded a power-sharing arrangement before elections and called for more meetings to be held in El Salvador. [Redacted]

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Comment: Despite the lack of progress and impatience in the government, the talks probably will continue. Both sides stand to reap propoganda benefits by appearing genuinely interested in a political solution. Unless one side gains a substantial military advantage, however, any real attempts at compromise are unlikely. [Redacted]

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
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Spain's Autonomous Regions



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
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
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
SPAIN: Labor Unrest

The Communist Party and the Communist-dominated Workers' Commissions are beginning to oppose the Socialist government more actively. Both organizations are focusing on economic grievances, but they also are opposing Spain's participation in NATO and the government's policy on the autonomous regions. In recent weeks they have supported farmers' demonstrations in Andalucia and Extremadura, the seizure by workers of steelmaking facilities in Sagunto, a miners' strike in Asturias, and countrywide strikes by railroad workers. The Communists and unions will hold anti-NATO demonstrations later this month.




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Comment: The government will take the Communist actions seriously. Communist mobilization efforts contribute to the military's concern about public order and damage business confidence in the stability of the country. The government has discredited the Communists in the past by emphasizing their political motives. It probably will use the democratic trade unions again, in which the Socialists are predominant, to head off Communist-fomented demonstrations.



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Future Antinuclear Protest Sites



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Special Analysis

WESTERN EUROPE: Peace Movements' Plans for Protests

Most groups in the peace movement are preparing for mass demonstrations later this month, but some activists are concerned about low turnouts to date and are seeking a better long-term strategy. Younger and more radical groups want to focus on blockades of military bases and more disruptive activity, while moderate groups want to emphasize lobbying and educational campaigns. At the same time, some leaders fear a psychological letdown if INF deployment begins on schedule. These differences and uncertainties probably will reduce the size of demonstrations substantially by mid-1984.



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In West Germany, most peace groups are busy preparing for the nationwide "Action Week" of 15-22 October that will culminate in large demonstrations in Bonn, Hamburg, Stuttgart, and Neu Ulm. Those protests, however, may be upstaged to some degree by the efforts of the Green Party and others to blockade Ramstein airbase on 14 and 15 October.




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Protests in the Nordenham-Bremerhaven area during 13 through 15 October will test the strength and cohesiveness of groups that advocate vigorous direct action against US and NATO-related facilities. Some organizations are planning a peaceful blockade of US barracks in Bremerhaven. Others hope to march to the harbors and take actions against ships or private firms involved in NATO logistic support.



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Although isolated violence may occur this fall, the radicals' hopes of creating widespread disorder appear to be dwindling.

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Italy and the UK

In Italy, protesters last week used a blockade to halt the construction on the INF base at Comiso, Sicily, for two days. Further delays are likely later this fall.



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
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The largest anti-INF event in Italy this fall is likely to be a demonstration in Rome on 22 October, to which the Communist Party has decided to contribute heavily. In recent months demonstrations on the Italian mainland have not grown in size or frequency over the sporadic activities of the past. The most important developments in the antinuclear controversy are likely to occur in Parliament, where the Communists and extreme left parties are demanding a debate and a vote on INF deployment.



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In the UK, except for a large demonstration scheduled for 22 October in London, the peace movement probably will be less active than the ones in West Germany and Italy. Leaders of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament seem worried that the government has won the battle for public opinion, and they now believe that they have to broaden their appeal to other political groups besides the left. Some leaders claim that too much emphasis has been placed on demonstrations, but this may be a reaction to the reduced attendance at recent protests.



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There has been considerable friction between leaders of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the militant women who are camped at the Greenham Common base. The latter have undercut the antinuclear movement by their nonconformist behavior and advocacy of unpopular causes unrelated to the peace issue.



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Prospects

The tactics of some of the larger protest groups have come full circle. After concentrating in turn on demonstrations and passive resistance, they are focusing again on lobbying politicians. Their shifting tactics reflect the obstacles they have encountered in trying to alter traditional security policies.



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Despite the likely tapering off of protest activity after December, many of the elements that have combined to produce major protests during the past two years will remain. These include dissatisfied young people, experienced agitators, and advice and funds from the East to make up any deficits. As a result, strong protest activity could develop again in the face of new nuclear weapons programs after INF.



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Special Analysis

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Increasing Insurgent Aggressiveness

The Afghan insurgents put considerable pressure on urban centers and on Soviet and Afghan convoys and military posts throughout the summer. Although the guerrillas' increasing effectiveness and the problems of the Soviet and Afghan military do not threaten the USSR's control in Afghanistan, they do raise Moscow's costs. Insurgent activity probably will remain near current levels, at least until the onset of winter weather.



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In August the insurgents were especially effective in carrying out well-coordinated mortar and rocket attacks on Kabul. Security also deteriorated in the other major cities of Qandahar and Herat.



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Afghan officials are worried that Kabul may be the scene of a "bloodbath" in the coming months.



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Contrast in Morale

Insurgents in Paktia and Paktika Provinces near the Pakistani border inflicted heavy losses on Soviet and Afghan forces.



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


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
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Moscow's Strategy

The Soviets probably will continue their strategy of attrition, hoping that war weariness will develop among the guerrillas and the civilians who support them. To maintain current levels of security against the growing insurgent threat, however, the Soviets may consider at least small-scale reinforcements.



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
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